Robert Jervis, perception and misperception, 1976

发布于 2022-03-07  152 次阅读


Robert Jervis, perception and misperception in international politics, 1976

non atheoretical, but not a theory
不是非理论的,也不是一个理论

key concepts:
• Uncertainty 不确定性
• Intentions v.s. Interests 意图v.s.利益
• Security dilemma/spiral model 螺旋模型/威慑模型
• Trust/trustworthiness 信任/可信性
• Signaling & reading signaling信号与信号解读
• Reassurance确保
• Reputation声誉
• The domino effect 多米诺骨牌效应
• Sunk costs 沉没成本
(the concepts jervis invents:
uncertainty; intentions & interests; security dilemma; spiral model;)

Two important messages

  • IR needs a multi-levelled and systematic rather than structural approach towards social sciences. (methodological eclecticism)方法论的折中主义\科学主义和经典路径的结合体\从宏观层面研究国际关系的解毒剂(背景是华尔兹希望论证国关是科学而非艺术)
  • IR needs to appreciate the complexity of social systems (thus he refuses to give clear-cut answers to many questions)
    反革命主义、进步主义和科学主义

difference between pattern & machanism
pattern:模式 一个人怕猫
machanisms:机制 一个人为什么怕猫
We need a lot of evidence to prove a stable pattern, however, case study is to discover machanisms. Jervis's book is lack of pattern, but do good search in machanism. He done a good job at process tracing.

(Learning politics is not like making cakes, at most cases, you get a afflatus or intuition first, and then you prove it.)

The central themes:
• What are the causes and consequences of misperception?
• What kinds of perceptual errors commonly occur in decision-making?
• How are beliefs about politics and images of other actors formed and altered?
• How do decision-makers draw inferences from information, especially information that could be seen as contradicting their own views?

perception matters 知觉的重要性
level of analysis: 决策、非决策(政府机构、国家类型和国内政治、国际环境)
起火房间的类比,就算起火了我们要跑,知觉也帮助我们判断从哪里跑,所以知觉是有用的

two-step model: deterrence & the spiral model

Deterrence model 威慑理论
·Great dangers arise if an aggressor believes that the status quo powers are weak in capability or resolve. (p. 58)
·The state must display the ability and willingness to wage war. (p. 58)
·The game of “Chicken”(p.59)

The Spiral model
·Roots:the anarchic setting of international relations(p.66)
·Security Dilemma:not evil but tragedy(p. 62)
·Prisoner's Dilemma(p. 62)
螺旋模式担心每一方都高估了对方的攻击性

deterrence model & spiral model代表了两种类型的国家:statue quo 现状国 & revionist 修正国
前者重视security, 后者希望要更大的蛋糕,重视power
these two models wants to distinguish which kind a country is.

Robert Jervis, perception and misperception, 1976
Robert Jervis, perception and misperception, 1976

第二个模型 以朝鲜和美国为例 螺旋模型是可以被制止的
这两个模型是用于事后判断的,在事中比较难判断。

The interact between countries sometimes is not based on a specific case. if you have a tensive relation with another country, you will not propaganize its kindness. it leads to a bad image in public. which create a vicious circle.

processes of preception 导致错误知觉的机制:

  1. Cognitive Consistency 认知相符

Consistency:Rational and Irrational
Consistency can largely be understood in terms of the strong tendency for people to see what they expect to see and to assimilate incoming information to pre-existing images. (p. 117)

The Necessary Interdependence of Facts and Theories

Cognitive Distortion and Implications for Decision-Making ·Excessive and Premature Cognitive Closure
·Confidence, Commitment, and Ambiguity

  1. The Impact of the Evoked Set 诱发定势

Evoked Set in the absence of communication

Communication and Estimating the Evoked Set of the Others The First Level of Communication Barriers:the ability to understand what message the other is trying to convey (p. 205)

Differences in Evoked Set Caused by differences in Concerns (由关注差异引起的诱发集差异)
Tunnel vision the decision-maker assumes that others are focused on that which concerns him. (p. 212)(隧道视觉,认为对方的关注点与自己是一样的)

  1. How Decision-Makers Learn from History 从历史中学习

The Learning process
Overgeneralization

Events from Which People learn most

What Lessons Do People Learn?
Impact of Constant Factors
Lessons about Specific Actors
Reactions to failure(一朝怕蛇咬,十年怕井绳)
Nothing Fails Like Success

Attitude change 态度转变
a Mechanisms of Attitude Preservation and Change

common misperception 常见的错误知觉

  1. perception of centralization 统一性知觉

A common misperception is to see the behavior of others as more centralized. planned and coordinated than it is. This is a manifestation of the drive to squeeze complex and unrelated events into a coherent pattern (p. 319)

Centrality
·We hypothesize that those parts of the image that are least central--i.e. the fewest other cognitions depend on them-- and least important will change first.(p. 297)
·This hypothesis helps account for the prevalence of conspiracy theories. (p. 301)

Beliefs Especially Resistant to Discrepant Information
·The Substance of the beliefs inherent bad faith model
·The Way the beliefs have been established

内涵:决策者过高估计对手掌握权力的程度和政策制定的统一性:
并将由复杂原因造成的偶然事件当作对方精心谋划的行动

原理:奥卡姆剃刀法则(the law of Occam' s Razor)。认知复杂的原因是困难的,人们倾向于用尽可能简单的理由解释对方的行为。

Special cases:
1联盟外国家比联盟内成员国更倾向于高估联盟的团结程度。
2相互敌对的集团倾向于高估对方内部的团结程度。

后果:pp.338-340
a. Misleading
b. Reduce the effectiveness
c. Illusory incompatibility 虚假的不协调

  1. Overestimating One's Importance as Influence or Target

决策者往往过高估计自己的影响力和被影响的程度
When the other behaves in accord with the actor's desires. he will overestimate the degree to which his policies are responsible for the outcome.
对方行为符合己方的愿望——“一定是我的政策影响了对方的行为”
Result:
缓解紧张局势的努力常常失败,因为A认为B的行动不是主动释放友好信号,而是因为A的强硬措施起了作用。

  1. wishful thinking 愿望思维

When the others behavior is undesired, the actor is likely to see it as derived from internal sources rather than as being a response to his own actions
对方行为不符合己方的愿望一一“一定是对方的问题”
Result 还没有完全处于敌对关系的两国,其关系加速恶化,因为A认定B在有意识地针对自己
eg: 张伯伦的“绥靖政策”;
agrarian reform in vietnam is based on the lead of China, the chairmen in vietnam views it as too radicalness, however, the Chinese leader told him 'the empior can not blame on himself'. 越南的土地改革是在中国的领导下进行的,越南的主席认为这太激进了,然而,中国领导人告诉他“皇帝不能怪自己”。

  1. cognitibe dissonance 认知失调

决策者试图证明自己的行为是正确的,并想办法减轻矛盾感,弱化认知失调。这会导致一种政策惯性,因为他不断自我强化自己是正确的这一观念。

认知失调的程度收到资源投入和激励与强制的影响。前者与沉没成本有关,可能导致高估成就、将失败视为成功,加强对具体目标和战利品的重视。后者都可能减轻决策者作出决策或违心选择的压力。
eg: the domino effect in war in vietnam

The Fallacy of grafting Psychology to IR
哪种认知过程在发挥主导作用?
a. Many psychology-based works on IR tend to single out one or two psychological traits in order to explain more fairly complex social facts, often without combining them with political factors. Alternatively, they tend to pit different psychological traits against each other as if our brain always operate using one circuit at a time.
• 愿望思维(wishful thinking)⼈们在接收信息的时候,总是趋于避开⾃⼰不愿听到和看到的事情,总是希望接收到⾃⼰愿意听到和看到的消息。例如:张伯伦的“绥靖政策”
• 诱发定势(Evoked Set)⼈脑中处于前沿位置的内容对其知觉的影响——正在集中关注和 考虑的问题为定势;决策者重新调整其关注焦点是很困难的事情,“沟通”也无济于事。例如:⽇军偷袭珍珠港,肖特将军的诱发定势(对情报的误读) 草⽊皆兵
韩国对朝鲜发展核武器的决策过程必然受到wishful thinking和 evoked set的双重影响: Wishful thinking: 希望朝鲜是可以放弃核武器的
Evoked set: 朝鲜亡韩国之⼼不死(因此会不择⼿段)

A key challenge for the psychological study of IR is to link psychological factors with big issues. On this front, constructivism’s emphasis on identity and identity changes is an obvious trial field. However, much of constructivism for years has been very structural.

如何减少决策中的错误知觉 minimizing misperception

更清晰地传递意图
启用异见者
克服官僚机构的身份使命不一致的问题
……


other comments

personal critics
理论创新:将微观层面的心理认知理论引入国际关系分析,密闭了新现实主义和新自由制度注意对个体层次的忽视。解释理性行为体的非理性决策。
不足:实验者与实践者有区别、个体推断整体

唐世平:缺乏对情感的关注;对各种概念的适用范围不完全一致;论证多用国内案例,一定程度上忽视了国际无政府状态对知觉的影响。
the absence of evidence does not mean the evidence of absent

信号与欺骗:国际关系中的形象逻辑
system effects, 1997
chapter4 is critical

what is omitted: emotions
he views decision-makers as rational person. however, most person has many complicate preconditions. sometimes he could be emotional. political emotions could be irrational.
他认为决策者是理性的人。然而,大多数人都有许多复杂的先决条件。有时他会很情绪化。政治情绪可能是非理性的。例如:
egocentrism: 自我中心主义
ethnocentrism:种族中心主义
fear:恐惧

在P&M基础之上发展出来的国际政治⼼理学研究
• Ernest R. May, Lessons of the Past: Uses and Misuses of History, 1975
• Richard Ted Lebow, Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis, 1981
• Deborah W. Larson, Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation, 1985
• Barbara Rearden Farnham, Roosevelt and the Munich Crisis: A Study of Political Decision-making, 1991
• Jonathan Mercer, Reputation in International Politics, 1996
• Barbara Rearden Farnham, Roosevelt and the Munich Crisis: A Study of Political Decision-making, 1997